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Legal Origin and Social Solidarity: The Continued Relevance of Durkheim to 
Comparative Institutional Analysis 
 
Abstract  
By using the classic works of Durkheim as a theoretical platform, this research 
explores the relationship between legal system and social solidarity.  We found that 
certain types of civil law systems, most notably those of Scandinavia, are associated 
with higher levels of social capital and better welfare state provision.  However, we 
found the relationship between legal system and societal outcomes is considerably 
more complex than suggested by currently fashionable economistic legal origin 
approaches, and more in line with the later writings of Durkheim, and, indeed, the 
literature on comparative capitalisms. Relative communitarianism was strongly 
affected by relative development, reflecting the complex relationship between 
institutions, state capabilities and informal social ties and networks.   
 
 
Keywords: Durkheim, institutions, legal origin, neoliberalism, social solidarity, 
societal development. 
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Legal Origin and Social Solidarity: The Continued Relevance of Durkheim to 
Comparative Institutional Analysis 
 
With a focus upon social solidarity, tKLV FRPSDUDWLYH VWXG\ HODERUDWHV 'XUNKHLP¶V
work on the relationship between the law and society and compares it to more recent 
work on the role of law. Specifically, we explore continuities in the relationship 
between legal tradition, collectivism and the relative depth and stability of welfare 
institutions. Defining social solidarity as ¶the feeling of reciprocal sympathy and 
responsibility among members of a group which promotes mutual support¶, Wilde 
(2007: 171) has argued that the concept of solidarity has, until recently, only 
received relatively sporadic attention within the sociological discipline since 
'XUNKHLP¶V VHPLQDO ZRUN Nevertheless, the issue seems to be of perceived 
importance, especially because it has been claimed that the increasing incursion of 
market relationships into social contexts, formerly ordered through a sense of social 
solidarity located in mutual social attachments and reciprocal obligations as a guide 
to appropriate behaviour, has exacerbated anomie (see e.g. Etzioni, 1996; 2004). In a 
different vein, Habermas recently has observed that ¶the tendencies towards a 
EUHDNGRZQLQVROLGDULW\LQHYHU\GD\OLIH«LQZHVWHUQFLYLOVRFLHWLHV¶ had reduced the 
likelihood of the mobilization of a cohesive social movement for change (Habermas 
et al., 2010: 74). Moreover this apparent erosion of a sense of community, and the 
libertarian inclination to reduce society to an aggregation of individuals 
instrumentally joined for their own convenience, is often seen as the legacy of an 
unregulated free-market capitalism engendered by the hegemony of neoliberal 
policies (Etzioni, 1996: 156; Harvey, 2005; Cerny, 2008; Dardot and Laval, 2013) 
that are thought to be restructuring the global economy.  
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Despite variation according to historical and social context (see e.g. Foucault, 2008), 
it is widely thought that the key parameters of QHROLEHUDOLVP¶VXQGHUO\LQJQRUPDWLYH
rationality have demonstrated a remarkable adaptability and resilience, often in the 
face of evidential policy failure (see e.g. Peck, 2010; Dardot and Laval, 2013).  As 
Dardot and Laval (2013: 1-4) observe, crucial differences between neoliberalism and 
classical liberalism help us understand those parameters. In particular, neoliberalism 
rejects FODVVLFDOOLEHUDOLVP¶Vnaturalization of markets that justified the demand that 
the state must not intervene except to maintain private property rights.  As they 
indicate (ibid: 46-7), this passivity of classical liberalism contrasts sharply with 
neoliberal interventionism which paradoxically emphasizes the role of the state in 
guaranteeing the operation of free markets (see also Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007; 
Peck, 2010). Such a role is essential for neoliberals since markets are deemed 
unnatural and have to be forcefully promoted through normative policy agendas 
which embrace the state itself within the logic of competition.  
 
So, despite a range of guises, Peck (2010: 8-9) argues that the defining characteristic 
of neoliberalism is the capture and (re)use of the state to shape a freer market order, 
although how this is done has historically varied. In exploring this line of continuity 
he contrasts (ibid.: 17-23) the µfree-economy-and-minimalist-state¶ of µroll-back¶ 
Chicago-inspired neoliberalism with the µUROORXW«VRFLDOO\HPEHGGHGPDUNHWRUGHU¶ 
liberalism that underpinned the development of the social market economy in post-
war Germany that tried to work between µunfettered capitalism and state 
control¶(ibid.: 60). As the literature on variegated capitalism alerts us, whilst 
neoliberalism has global ecosystemic dominance, its relative forms and 
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consequences persistently vary between contexts (Author A). Moreover, as Dardot 
and Laval (ibid. 3-11) argue, drawing on )RXFDXOW¶V   earlier view, 
neoliberalism is a socially pervasive governmental rationality that inscribes non-
market social and political domains ZLWKWKHµIRUPDOSULQFLSOHVRIPDUNHWHFRQRP\¶
as a disciplinary regime: an extension of market rationality without precedence. This 
includes the articulation of self-entrepreneurial governance, through individual and 
collective internalization of competitive enterprise as aQ µH[LVWHQWLDO norm¶, where 
egoism is encouraged as an ontological necessity for competitive survival µto the 
detriment of collective solidarities¶.  
      
However the claim that such differentiating and individualistic processes are the 
predominant feature of contemporary society may be undermined by the evident 
enduring popularity of the desire to belong (see Guibernau, 2013). Alternatively 
these processes may articulate new (see Crow, 2002), sometimes relatively hidden, 
social bonds (Spencer and Pahl, 2006), which even when self-selected and 
individuated can realize collective concerns (Wilkinson, 2010: 467). Nevertheless, 
others take a somewhat less nuanced view, suggesting a general individualization of 
social life (see Putnam, 1998; Etzioni, 2004). It is thought that this has been 
particularly evident in work organizations. Here, the decline of the corporatist 
consensus since the 1980s has been presented as a driving force behind broader 
processes of individualization (see Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). For example, 
it is thought that as part of an increasingly post-bureaucratic organizational 
trajectory, there have been moves towards marketizing employer-employee relations 
under the auspices of neoliberal requirements to open organizations to free market 
discipline. Ironically, such developments are often couched in anti-hierarchical 
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discourses that reversed critiques originally directed against capitalism per se into 
normative support (see Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007: 202). One result, it is 
claimed, has been the decay of workplace social relations, once often based upon 
mutuality and ¶traditional obligation¶ (Hendry, 2001: 213; see also Vallas and Hill, 
2012), to create more precarious and individualized employment relationships 
(Kalleberg, 2009) in the name of entrepreneurial governance and the 
entrepreneurialization of the self (see Dardot and Laval, 2013).  
 
Such a view of the effects of neoliberalism, especially upon the workplace, echoes 
'XUNKHLP¶V HJ  -8) FULWLTXH RI 6SHQFHU¶V version of utilitarianism. For 
Dardot and Laval (2013: 28-47), 6SHQFHU¶V µELRORJLFDO HYROXWLRQLVP¶ was a turning 
point in liberal doctrine which influenced later neoliberal ideas regarding the primacy 
of competition in social relations so as not to arrest evolution. Moreover, in a proto-
neoliberal manner, Spencer saw WKHVWDWH¶VUHPLWZDVonly ¶to guarantee the execution 
of freely agreed contracts¶ (ibid: 31) as a precondition for free competition between 
private interests.  For Durkheim, 6SHQFHU¶V utilitarian norms would undermine social 
solidarity by unfettering egoism through failing to place normative limits upon 
aspirations and their efficacious pursuit (see also Chriss, 2010). Indeed, Durkheim 
believed that the division of labour was not merely an economic phenomenon but a 
key potential source of social solidarity (1964): hence contemporary developments in 
the workplace would be of significant concern to Durkheim due to their potential for 
exacerbating anomie. Indeed he argued (ibid.) that although individual autonomy was 
a necessary feature of the modern world, this needed to be balanced with organic 
social solidarities that tempered egoism with altruism, so as to preserve individual 
well being and social coherence. At times Durkheim saw the law as a µkey¶ to 
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understanding society, given its role in underwriting social solidarity but, at other 
times, he saw the law as only one of several defining institutions (see Cotterrell 
1999). Throughout, however, he remained convinced that certain legal traditions, 
above all French civil law, were relatively effective in promoting social ties. 
 
The research reported here seeks to explore the extent to which the law and, more 
specifically, legal origin impacts on social solidarity using a panel of developed and 
developing nations over several years. We, fLUVWLQWURGXFH'XUNKHLP¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of institutions and the law and how he saw it as the ¶key¶ indicator of underlying 
modes of social solidarity. We then highlight key differences between Durkheim and 
the main alternative contemporary ways of conceptualizing institutions, and their 
respective relevance for understanding differences encountered in social solidarities 
between different national locales. Next, we consider different types of legal system 
and their relationship to different expressions of social solidarity.  Specifically, we 
compare legal origin to social capital, social protection, and the relative extent of 
communitarianismµPHFKDQLVPVRIVROLGDULW\¶WKDWKDYHEHHQDWWDFNHGE\QHROLEHUDOV
as sources of individual irresponsibility and systemic inefficiencies (Dardot and 
Laval, 2013: 164-5). We proceed to explore the degree to which, given the decline of 
welfare institutions in many national economies, the effects of the law are becoming 
less pronounced. Finally, we draw out the implications of this study.  
 
Durkheim: Social Solidarity and Legal Systems 
For Durkheim, social solidarity is about shared commitments to social practices; 
social regulation is direct and externalized control over such practices via law and 
custom (Adair, 2008: 106). Durkheim saw legal regulation as a key to the 
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maintenance of social solidarity, whilst being an expression and indicator of 
differences in underlying moral sentiments and forms of social solidarity (see also 
Prosser, 2006). However, he held that the complexity of social relationships and 
VROLGDULWLHV LV SURSRUWLRQDO WR WKH QXPEHU RI SURPXOJDWHG OHJDO UXOHV 'XUNKHLP¶V
views were shaped by the role of continental civil law systems ± especially French 
law ± that place an emphasis on promoting social cohesion (1964: 371). Therefore, 
Durkheim believed that the quality of law could provide an index of social solidarity: 
it is one manifestation of the degree of social solidarity encountered within a society 
as well as being, for some, an explanation of variations in solidarity (Prosser, 2006: 
371-380). For example, Durkheim thought that inequality could be superseded by 
social solidarity through legal mediation: this fundamentally reflects the civil rather 
than the common law tradition (see Cotterrell, 1999). 
 
Durkheim (1964; c.f. Cotterrell 1999: 33) saw law as central to understanding society, 
arguing that law also constituted an externalized manifestation of  social solidarity. 
Therefore one needed to classify the law to better understand and categorize the 
underlying, associated, social solidarity. Durkheim further argued that the law in itself 
is also a manifestation of the evolution of social solidarity and moral sentiments and 
non-legal societal features (e.g. occupational groups and professional associations) 
could also have a strong effect. Moreover, compromises between different interests 
were possible and were indeed desirable in pluralistic, industrialized, societies with 
increasingly complex divisions of labour (see Durkheim 1957: 13-17). This would 
suggest that whilst legal origin exerts a long term effect, the actual effect of the law 
would change over the years, due to non-legal societal dynamics and, indeed, the 
extent to which the latter might feed into legislation.  However, it has been argued 
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that common law systems generally favour a particular social grouping, property 
owners, and accord them priority over other interests in society; civil law systems in 
FRQWUDVW VHHN WR SURPRWH VRFLDO VROLGDULW\ DQG ³UHIOHFWV RUJDQLF VROLGDULW\´ +DUW
1967:1). 
 
Civil and Common Law 
There is in the literature a key distinction between civil law and common law contexts 
(c.f. Hart 1967). In common law systems, much of the law is made by judges, and 
tends to focus on protecting individual rights and liberties. In contrast, civil law, on 
which Durkheim focused, tends to have more comprehensive legislation than is usual 
in common law countries. Here the constitution and the legislation are more important 
and, it can be argued, in order to be durable, this tends to necessitate social 
compromise. Hence, civil law, according to Durkheim (1964), aims to promote social 
inclusion. Indeed, the emphasis on solidarity in certain continental European (civil 
law) state traditions aimed to overcome class antagonisms through a commitment to 
universal social progress.  
 
To Durkheim, social solidarity could represent the natural consequence of an 
advanced division of labour. Indeed he initially thought that anomie was unnatural 
and transient (1964: 377) and that an organic solidarity would inevitably develop that 
would support the interdependencies that were the product of an increasingly complex 
division of labour. However, his later work was pessimistic about this social 
trajectory since he thought that the increasing forced division of labour and the 
diaspora of Utilitarian norms would produce dangerous tensions by exacerbating 
economic egoism even whilst simultaneously increasing mutual interdependencies 
10 
 
VHH HJ  7R DPHOLRUDWH WKLV SUREOHP KH VDZ WKH QHHG WR GHYHORS D ³IUHHO\
ZLOOHG´ FROOHFtive conscience (1961: 120) that balanced individual autonomy with 
collective co-operation (see also Pearce, 2001: 155). For Durkheim (1964: 25) these 
norms FRXOG EH GLVVHPLQDWHG E\ GHPRFUDWLFDOO\ FRQVWLWXWHG ³RFFXSDWLRQDO JURXSV´
who, like their medieval guild forerunners, would socialize members into accepting 
moral obligations to others as a basis of economic activity, thereby constraining 
economic egoism by a countervailing altruism and promoting an ³XQIRUFHG´GLYLVLRQ
of labour (1964: 376). 
 
In reaction to earlier work that sought to depict him as a conservative figure, who 
never changed his basic ideas (although his interests shifted from economics to the 
role of religion in societies) (Nisbet 1967), an influential body of more recent 
Durkheim studies sought not only to draw out the more challenging (indeed, as Lukes 
(1973) argued, radical) elements of his work, but also divide the latter into early and 
late periods on rather different lines (Fournier 2005). The former is depicted as 
³PDWHULDOLVWLF DQG GHWHUPLQLVW´ DQG WKH ODWWHU DV ³PRUH LGHDOLVWLF DQG EHQHYROHQW´
(ibid.: 43-44).  This led to much debate as to how more precisely such periods might 
be delineated.  Critics such as Giddens (1971) argued for a more precise approach, 
clearly delineating the contribution in specific works.  Fournier (2005) suggests that 
there was, in fact, a period of transition, when Durkheim began to accord greater 
attention to ideas and religion in social life, making it difficult to clearly delineate 
early and late stages, which, in any event, only corresponded with a few years¶ gap. 
Perhaps a key delineator is the relative attention in different works that Durkheim 
accorded to seeking to reconcile individualism and social solidarity (c.f. Greenhouse 
2011); he was a profoundly political thinker, with a deep interest in the role of the 
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power and the state within this nexus, and alert to the dangers of economic liberalism 
in the absence of societal mediation (Fournier 2005: 48; Joas 1993). Indeed Durkheim 
recognized that in certain legal contexts moves to organic solidarity would prove 
difficult. Within a common law framework that prioritizes private property, 
abnormalities could arise, in the form of inequality and conflict: a forced division of 
labour that engenders anomie and undermines social solidarity (Wilde, 2007: 173), 
ultimately antithetical to growth. Therefore, as Wilde (2007:175) notes, common law 
may promote individual inclusion but it undermines social inclusion owing to the 
¶huge disparities flowing from the market system¶ it supports.  
 
More recently, there has been a revival in investigating the effects of legal system on 
economy and society, but from a very different starting point to that of Durkheim. For 
example, La Porta et al. (1999; 2002; Botero et al., 2004) are within the mainstream 
economic tradition that construes institutions as mechanisms that primarily enable or 
constrain the rational choices of profit-maximizing actors. They argue (e.g. 1999) that 
common law systems are orientated towards protecting property owner rights, whilst in 
civil law systems they are mediated by other social interests; they see a zero sum trade-
off between property owner rights and economic growth on the one hand, and employee 
rights and welfare provision on the other. Moreover, La Porta et al. (1999) suggest legal 
origin over-codes (through its role in securing private property rights) all other 
institutional features.  However, in common with Durkheim, they suggest that civil law 
favours the interests of a broad cross section of stakeholders, as averse to assigning a 
particular social grouping primacy (La Porta et al. 1999; Baxi 1973; Hart 1967). 
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Above all, although united in their view as to the importance of the law and the state, 
what sets Durkheim apart from the contemporary work of La Porta and colleagues, is 
that whilst the latter see the law as beneficially diluting social restraint, Durkheim 
viewed the potential of the law in precisely opposite terms.   Society is not simply about 
ULJKWV EXW DOVR DERXW REOLJDWLRQV ZKDW GLG KRZHYHU VKLIW LQ 'XUNKHLP¶V ZRUN ZDV
away from a mistrust of mass action towards a more inclusive kind of corporatism 
(Fournier 2005).   
 
The Law and Social Solidarity: Key Concepts and Hypotheses 
Social solidarity is a complex phenomenon that encompasses many different 
dimensions, making the testing of the relationship between the law and social 
solidarity problematic. Hence, we explore the relationship between the law and 
different sub-dimensions or expressions of social solidarity.  The civil law tradition is 
itself a diverse and complex one.  Durkheim (1964) held that French legal tradition 
countries represented the epitome of civil law. Other categories of civil law would 
include German and Scandinavian law, where property rights are not as weak and 
collective rights as strong as in French law, but are weaker than in common law 
systems (La Porta et al. 1999).  As Cotterrell (1999) observes Durkheim would have 
had little problem with an emphasis on the differences between common and civil law 
traditions, given his concern with social solidarity. Moreover, it seems likely that 
countries with common law traditions would be more receptive to neoliberal 
governance, given that judge-made law appears to be more responsive to the needs of 
property owners than civil law legislation (La Porta et al. 1999). There has been a 
proliferation of theoretically eclectic theories rooted within the broad socio-economic 
tradition that aim to combine the range of institutional features into defined country 
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categories (Amable, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999).   Although these 
authors are discussing a much wider range of institutions, the liberal market economy 
(LME) category common to all these analyses largely mirrors the common law 
category discussed here (the only exceptions would be the hybrid legal systems of 
Scotland and Quebec, despite their location within LMEs). 
 
A first requirement in turning this discussion into testable propositions is to define our 
terms. It is thought that there are numerous ways in which social solidarity may be 
articulated and hence measured (Kushner and Stark, 2004; Allik and Realo, 2004).  
One would be manifested through social capital, that is, the depth of the network 
between individuals that makes social life possible and underpins economic growth 
(Hollaway, 2008: 7). This argument draws KHDYLO\RQ'XUNKHLP¶VZRUNand suggests 
that social capital reflects trust, reciprocity, civil engagement and community 
networks (Kushner and Stark, 2004; Allik  and Realo, 2004). Whilst it could be 
argued that social capital encompasses numerous other things as well, such as 
cultural, economic and human capital (Carpriano and Kelly, 2005), overall we follow 
the tenor of the debate and suggest that, as an expression of social solidarity, social 
capital will be higher in civil law states, hence: 
 
H1: Civil law countries have higher levels of social capital than common law 
ones. 
 
Durkheim (1964; Cladis, 1992: 2) held that there are two positions against which 
moral theories may be grouped: individualistic liberalism and communitarianism.  As 
we have already indicated, cHQWUDOWR'XUNKHLP¶VWKHRU\RIVRFLHW\ZDVDFRQYLFWLRQ
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of the need to reconcile individual rights and freedoms with both social solidarity and 
a commitment to the collective wellbeing: in other words, both social ties and a 
shared agenda (see also Etzioni, 1996). So communitarianism both represents social 
solidarities that would act as a bulwark against anomie (Cladis, 1992: 2) and sets an 
agenda for social and institutional change (see also Tam, 1998) by promoting the 
conditions necessary for the development of organic solidarity. Therefore: 
 
H2: Civil law countries are likely to be more communitarian than common 
law ones. 
 
An alternative indicator of social solidarity is the existence and coverage of welfare 
institutions (Baldwin, 1990).   Where encompassing, these signal a willingness to treat 
all citizens fairly, through ¶reapportioning the costs of risks and mischance¶, so that 
the vulnerable do not bear a disproportionate burden, and the more fortunate share out 
the costs of events that do not immediately concern them (Baldwin, 1990: 1).  Risks 
are pooled, with individuals benefitting from membership of a larger group; society 
shares out the costs, recognizing both the principle of equity and social solidarity as 
³terms of citizenship´Baldwin, 1990. 2).   Hence, the welfare state enhances social 
cohesion and solidarity (Schmitt, 2000; Plant et al., 1980). In other words, rather than 
relying on chance, the rules and benefits of association were strengthened (Baldwin 
1990:2).  Hence, the welfare state provides social checks and balances, mediating 
tensions within and between groups (Palumbo and Scott, 2003: 9). Therefore: 
 
H3: Civil law countries have a stronger welfare state. 
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Durkheim, who held that non legal societal elements may also impact on social 
solidarities and, indeed, so might legislation over time (Durkheim, 1957: 13-17), would 
have recognized these analyses, although other accounts, such as La Porta et al. (1999) 
would see legal origin as not easily subject to change.  Beyond the legal environment, 
the 1990s and 2000s have seen strong pressures to liberalization, which may have eroded 
collective solidarities. Author A argues that although individual national economies 
retain distinct institutional features, neoliberalism has attained global ecosystemic 
dominance, eroding national level ties, relations and solidarities.  This is a process that 
has been underway since the 1980s, but has intensified in the 2000s.   Hence: 
 
H4: The relative strength of the welfare state has declined in civil law 
countries since 1990, and the relative gap with common law countries has 
narrowed. 
 
Methodology 
Measures 
The basis for testing the hypotheses outlined above revolves around the cross-country 
differences between the different measures of social solidarity and the legal origins of 
the countries within the analysis. As highlighted in the discussion above, social solidarity 
is a very complex relationship involving numerous factors, consequently producing a 
single definitive measure of social solidarity would be very difficult. Since social 
solidarity equates to sympathy for, and commitment to, fellow citizens it would be 
plausible to establish a measure of this via primary data at the individual level, but this 
would become considerably more challenging when making comparisons at the societal 
level, as is being undertaken here. However as the hypotheses developed in the previous 
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section identify specific areas of activity, as in effect proxies for different aspects of 
social solidarity, those precise proxies are used in the empirical analysis. The measures 
used for social solidarity are as are discussed below. 
 
FirsW6RFLDO&DSLWDOLVPHDVXUHGXVLQJWKH,QJOHKDUW¶VVRFLDOFDSLWDOLQGH[EDVHG
upon organisational memberships. Second, at the level of societal culture, we measure 
the relative extent of communitarianism using the individualism/ collectivism continuum 
developed by Diener et al (2000), 
  
There are two measures reflecting the strength of the welfare state. Firstly, total social 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP in 2009, taken from OECD 2012, is used as an 
absolute measure of the size of the welfare state. Then we need a measure of change, so 
we assess changes in social expenditure as a proportion of GDP between the years 1990 
DQG  7KLV LV XVHG DV D PHDVXUH RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V VWUHQJWKHQLQJ RU RWKHUZLVH
commitment to the welfare state over this period. 1990 was chosen as the start point 
since this was the longest period giving coverage to the majority of the countries 
included in the analysis. 
 
Categorizing Countries 
To test these hypotheses we need to examine countries that provide a basis of 
comparison not only between common and civil law, but also the different legal families 
within the latter: pure French civil law, and the German and Scandinavian legal 
traditions.  There is much debate around the latter Scandinavian legal traditions.  Some 
writers, such as La Porta et al. (1999) have suggested that they are hybrid and 
incorporate both civil and common law features, bringing them closer to the latter. 
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However, Siems and Deakin (2009) suggest that it is overly simplistic to categorize them 
as weakened civil law systems. Indeed they argue that Scandinavian legal origin in 
particular appears to more effective than classic French legal origin in realizing the 
solidarity ideals of civil law.  
 
It is potentially plausible that alternative factors at the national level explain differences 
in social cohesion. Esping-Anderson (1990) with his classification of countries as 
Liberal, Corporatist-Statist or Social Democratic based on an index of 
decommodification offers the closest alternative. However, as argued by O'Connell 
(1991), it is the historical legacy and institutional structure that mainly determines the 
positioning within the index: implying that legal tradition would play a key role in 
explaining both the extent of decommodification and level of social cohesion, hence it is 
the correct country classification to be applied to this analysis.   In terms of legal origin, 
a key distinction is whether law is judge made (that is broad brush legislation, fleshed 
out by case law, that is court decisions), or civil law (more explicit legislation, vesting 
legislatures, and by extension, interest groupings with more direct say) (Plucknett 2010; 
Shleifer and Vishy 1997). The latter in turn, may be divided up into classic French civil 
law and German and Scandinavian variations. 
  
In order to make the analysis as robust as possible the widest range of countries is 
included in the study, given the constraints of the measures outlined previously. In 
simple terms any country that fits into the categorization of legal origin, and where data 
is available for at least one of the measures, has been included in the analysis. For Social 
Capital and Individualism-Collectivism the measures are largely static, hence the 
analysis and findings are not sensitive to the time period. Whereas the strength of the 
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welfare state is likely to display more variation over time and the findings will be more 
sensitive to the time period considered. Therefore data from 2009 is used as indicative of 
the strength of the welfare state since this is the final year before increased pressure from 
the ongoing global recession started to really cut into social expenditure. Finally, for the 
analysis of changes to the relative strength of the welfare state over time, 1990 is chosen 
as the start point as this is when OECD data becomes available for a large number of 
countries and enables the largest cross-section of countries to be used in the analysis. 
 
Analysis  
The empirical analysis is then undertaken by highlighting similarities between each of 
the four measures of social solidarity and the legal origins of the countries included in 
the study. A total of 27 countries are used in the analysis, with these being countries 
where data is available for at least one of the four social solidarity measures.  The values 
of each of the four measures of social solidarity for all of the countries are reported 
below in Table 1. 
  
Cluster analysis is applied to present a clearer picture as to the patterns within groups of 
countries sharing the same legal origins. The basis of cluster analysis is to group 
observations so that those within the group display greater similarity with each other 
than those in the other groups. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering is applied using the 
Euclidean distances between observations.  
 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
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Findings 
Hierarchical cluster analysis is applied for all four measures of social solidarity and the 
results are reported below in Table 2. In each case the clusters are numbered from the 
lowest values in that category to the highest, i.e. for Social Capital those in cluster 1 have 
the lowest levels of social capital and cluster 4 the highest. In addition box plots for each 
of the measures are reported separately, with the box plot for social capital below in 
Figure 1. 
 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
 
On an observational level it is clear that higher levels of social capital are typically 
present in the Scandinaviani countries, whilst lower levels are typically displayed within 
the French origin legal systems in the Mediterranean countries. More specifically, 
looking at the cluster analysis, Column 3 in Table 2, Japan, Spain and the Netherlands 
are outliers in comparison to the other countries, with the former two being the lowest 
cluster and the latter the highest. This leaves all the remaining countries grouped within 
the remaining 2 clusters, with the Scandinavian countries exclusively placed within the 
highest of these. For the French and German origin countries, with the exception of the 
outliers, they are exclusively placed within the lowest of the remaining clusters. Finally 
the Common Law countries straddle the two clusters and the distinction is a North 
American/ European one with the USA and Canada having higher levels of social capital 
than the UK and Ireland.  
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Turning to the formal hypothesis outlined above, Hypothesis 1 predicts that Social 
Capital levels will be higher in Civil Law countries and this cannot be accepted in its 
entirety. It is clear that social capital is higher in the Scandinavian countries but that is 
certainly not the case for French and German origin countries. 
 
In relation to Individualism/Collectivism, Figure 2 and Column 4 Table 2, the most 
individualist countries are grouped within the Common Law, Scandinavian and French 
origin countries whilst the most collectivist are typically within the Common Law and 
French developing countries. This distinction is confirmed by the cluster analysis where 
almost exclusively the developed nations are grouped within the more individualist 
clusters whilst the developing nations are within the more collectivist groups. Hence, it 
would appear that individualism/ collectivism is more strongly influenced by the level of 
development than by legal origin. The only real exception to this is South Korea, which 
on many measures is no longer classified as a developing country, even though it is clear 
that this stage of development was achieved much later than any of the other countries 
included here. Clearly the implication from this is that Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted 
since there is no real evidence that Civil Law countries are more communitarian than the 
Common Law ones. 
 
<<Figure 2 about here>> 
 
The third hypothesis posits that Civil Law countries will have a stronger welfare state 
and, as far as a greater financial commitment equates to a stronger welfare state, we can 
explore this by examining Figure 3 and Table 2 column 5. It is noticeable that the lowest 
social expenditure as a proportion of GDP is amongst the developing countries; hence it 
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may be the case that the strength of the welfare state is more strongly influenced by the 
stage of development rather than legal origin. Beyond that, for the remaining countries, it 
is clear from both the box plot and the cluster analysis that the financial commitment to 
social expenditure is greater in Scandinavian and French origin countries than it is in 
Common Law countries. However this cannot be said to be the case for the German 
origin countries. As a result Hypothesis 3 can be partially accepted but only for the 
French origin and Scandinavian countries. However it must be pointed out that this 
measure of welfare state strength reveals nothing about an individual's personal 
experience of welfare state support and this is likely to vary significantly within each 
country. Government's regularly make decisions influencing the extent of welfare 
support for different groups within the economy, a process heightened in recent times by 
conflicting pressures from ageing populations combined with the need to reduce public 
expenditure, leading to a changing balance of welfare support between the young and 
old. Unfortunately analysis of this process is beyond the scope of this study and will 
have to be flagged up for future research. 
 
However it must be pointed out that this of this process is beyond the scope of this study 
and will have to be flagged up for future research 
. <<Figure 3 about here> 
 
Hypothesis 4 implies that social expenditure as a proportion of GDP will have risen at a 
slower rate in Civil Law countries than in Common Law ones, which can then be 
interpreted as a reduction in the relative strength of the welfare state. The evidence from 
both the box plot, Figure 4, and the cluster analysis, Table 2 column 6, does not concur 
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with this. With the exception of the French civil law countries there is no clear pattern 
based around legal origin that can be detected: Hypothesis 4 has to be rejected.  
 
Hence, the links between legal origin and social solidarity are somewhat uneven.  There 
is some evidence to support the view that legal origin impacts upon social solidarity but 
the relationship is more nuanced than a simple civil law/ common law dichotomy. 
Equally, factors beyond legal origin may be at least as important influences upon social 
solidarity as law. What we have found is in line with the qualifications Durkheim 
introduced in his later work and, indeed, the contemporary literature on comparative 
capitalisms (Fournier 2005; Amable, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001): assemblies of 
institutions and associated social relations mediate competing interests and facilitating 
beneficial outcomes.  However, it is at odds with writers such as La Porta et al. (1999) 
who, suggest legal origin over-codes (through its role in securing private property rights) 
all other institutional features. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study revealed that whilst legal system appears to be related to a range of societal 
features, the relationship is a complex one, as suggested by Durkheim in his later works. 
It also highlights the limitations of currently fashionable legal origins approaches in the 
economic and finance literatures, which suggest that legal origin has broad and universal 
explanatory power as to property owner rights, employee and stakeholder countervailing 
power, and social welfare (La Porta et al. 1999; Djankov et al. 2003). 
 
Firstly, social capital was higher in Scandinavia than countries operating under different 
legal origins.  This would suggest that Scandinavian societies have features that cannot 
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simply be ascribed to dilute or allegedly hybrid legal origins (La Porta et al. 1999). 
Either the law in Scandinavia has very distinct effects to other legal families, or the law 
in Scandinavia works in concert with a broader range of institutional features in such a 
manner as to reinforce higher levels of social capital; as we noted earlier this is a 
possibility suggested by Durkheim (c.f. Fournier 2005).  
 
Secondly, we found no evidence that civil law was an effective mechanism for 
promoting greater communitarianism. Rather, relative communitarianism appeared to 
be a function of relative development, with emerging markets recording higher levels 
of communitarian values than mature ones. Again, this would suggest that whilst, as 
we have seen, the law clearly impacts on a number of societal features, relative 
communitarianism is strongly affected by relative development. However, 
communitarianism encompasses both a commitment to the common good (which can 
include the modern welfare state), and traditional norms and values, although there is, 
in turn, a tension between the two. In other words, communitarianism encompasses 
both social solidarities and a shared agenda: the latter may be forward looking or look 
backwards to the values and conventions of the past (Lasch 1986: 60). This may 
explain why relative communitarianism is not aligned to any single aspect of 
institutional arrangements in the developed world. 
 
Moreover, ¶participationist¶ approaches suggest that relative communitarism represent a 
product of the degree of complexity and differentiation of institutional arrangements 
(Benhabib 1997:51).  Invariably, tensions and contradictions between different realms 
(e.g. economy, politics, family) mean that the possibility of agency is uneven; hence, 
even if specific national legal systems may be helpful in promoting specific aspects of 
24 
 
social solidarity, they are, again, unlikely to be perfectly aligned with other institutions, 
with any gains in promoting ties in one area being eroded through institutional 
shortcomings elsewhere (see Benhabib 1997:49-52). 
 
Legal origin does seem to be related to the relative development of welfare institutions, 
once the relative development of nations is taken into account. Scandinavian legal origin 
societies were the strongest in terms of welfare institutions, followed by France.   This 
would again suggest that there is more to the Scandinavian legal system ± and the 
assembly of social institutions around it ± than simply a dilution of the French civil law 
one.   In turn, French civil law systems were associated with superior welfare coverage 
to that provided by common law ones.  But, by the same measure, more developed 
nations provided better welfare provision than emerging ones. This would serve to 
highlight the extent to which it is not just the design of institutions but their evolution 
and the changing nature of inter-institutional linkages and support that determines 
societal outcomes. Again, this would echo the later work of Durkheim, where more 
attention was accorded to development and the relative fluidity of societal arrangements. 
 
Finally, we found that whilst the relative development of societies did matter, certain 
societal features were quite durable.  For example, we found that there was not a 
significant decline in the amount of resources devoted to the generally stronger welfare 
state of civil law countries vis-à-vis common law ones. In other words, differences 
between common and civil law systems in this area were not significantly eroding over 
time. This would suggest that, pressures to liberalization notwithstanding, the welfare 
state in civil law systems appears somewhat more durable than is often presumed. This 
might reflect the strong µbuy-in¶ of the electorate to key aspects of welfare institutions: 
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even if ecosystemically dominant, neoliberalism has not succeeded in erasing national 
institutional traditions or associated social practices. In other words, institutional 
arrangements underpinning a key dimension of social solidarity may be quite durable, in 
part reflecting the dualist nature between social structures and action (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Giddens 1971). However, it is possible that this may in part reflect further declines 
in the already more limited welfare provision encountered in common law systems. We 
cannot of course say whether the attacks on the welfare state following the global 
economic crisis that began in 2008 might not have changed this pattern.  
 
As predicted by Durkheim, legal origin does seem to be associated with a range of 
societal features ranging from welfare coverage to social capital. However, the 
relationship is a complex one, with institutional effects also being bound up with relative 
development. For example, developing economies were significantly more 
communitarian than developed ones, possibly reflecting the stronger role of tradition and 
associated values in underpinning communitarian values in such countries. It could be 
argued that communitarianism encompasses forward and traditionalist elements, the 
latter diluting any possible effects of differences brought about through legal systems, 
especially in the developing world. Scandinavian civil law countries still recorded higher 
levels of communitarianism than other advanced societies, highlighting the impact of the 
ODZZKHQWUDGLWLRQDOLVP¶VUROHLVGLPLQLVKHG 
 
We found a relationship between legal system and the strength of welfare institutions, 
with individuals being more willing to pool risk, the latter a key dimension of social 
solidarity in Scandinavian and French civil law countries. Whilst institutional 
arrangements may provide the foundation for different growth trajectories, clearly a 
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particular institutional recipe does not result in uniform societal outcomes regardless of 
relative state of development; it is not only formal institutional arrangements that matter, 
but also relative state capabilities and the operation and impact of informal social 
networks. 
 
Endnotes 
i) 6WULFWO\ VSHDNLQJ VLQFH RXU PHDVXUHV IRU ³6FDQGLQDYLDQ´ FRXQWULHV LQFOXGH
)LQODQGZHVKRXOGUHQDPHWKLVFDWHJRU\³1RUGLF´EXWZHKDYHFRQWLQXHGWR
XVHWKHWHUP³6FDQGLQDYLDQ´WRVWD\FORVHWRWKHOLWHUDWure.   
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Table 1: Measures of Social Solidarity 
 
 
          Change in 
    Social Individualism/ Social Social 
Country Legal Origin Capital Collectivism Expenditure Expenditure 
Canada Common Law 170 8.5 19 0.05 
Ireland Common Law 93 6 24 0.32 
UK Common Law 116 8.95 24 0.37 
USA Common Law 185 9.55 19 0.28 
India 
Common Law 
Dev   4.4     
Nigeria 
Common Law 
Dev   3     
South Africa 
Common Law 
Dev   5.7     
Belgium French 145 7.25 30 0.24 
France French 75 7.05 32 0.35 
Netherlands French 242 8.5 23 -0.12 
Argentina French Dev 93 4.8     
Brazil French Dev 85 3.9     
Chile French Dev 81 4.15 11 0.07 
Mexico French Dev 93 4 8 0.24 
Turkey French Dev   3.85 13 0.36 
Italy French Med 77 6.8 28 0.4 
Portugal French Med 68 7.05 26 0.66 
Spain French Med 15 5.55 26 0.31 
Austria German 112 6.75 29 0.27 
Germany German 135 7.35 27 0.27 
Japan German 20 4.3 22 0.55 
South Korea German 145 2.4 10 0.34 
Switzerland German 95 7.9 20 0.34 
Denmark Scandinavian 175 7.7 30 0.25 
Finland Scandinavian 175 7.15 29 0.26 
Norway Scandinavian 188 6.9 23 0.05 
Sweden Scandinavian 205 7.55 30 -0.02 
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Table 2: Cluster Analysis Results 
          Change in 
    Social Individualism/ Social Social 
Country Legal Origin Capital Collectivism Expenditure Expenditure 
Canada Common Law 3 4 2 2 
Ireland Common Law 2 3 3 3 
UK Common Law 2 4 3 3 
USA Common Law 3 4 2 3 
India 
Common Law 
Dev   2     
Nigeria 
Common Law 
Dev   1     
South Africa 
Common Law 
Dev   3     
Belgium French 2 3 4 3 
France French 2 3 4 3 
Netherlands French 4 4 3 1 
Argentina French Dev 2 2     
Brazil French Dev 2 2     
Chile French Dev 2 2 1 2 
Mexico French Dev 2 2 1 3 
Turkey French Dev   2 1 3 
Italy French Med 2 3 3 3 
Portugal French Med 2 3 3 4 
Spain French Med 1 3 3 3 
Austria German 2 3 4 3 
Germany German 2 3 3 3 
Japan German 1 2 3 4 
South Korea German 2 1 1 3 
Switzerland German 2 3 2 3 
Denmark Scandinavian 3 3 4 3 
Finland Scandinavian 3 3 4 3 
Norway Scandinavian 3 3 3 2 
Sweden Scandinavian 3 3 4 2 
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Figure 1: Social Capital Box Plot 
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Figure 2: Individualism/Collectivism Box Plot 
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Figure 3: Social Expenditure as a Proportion of GDP Box Plot 
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Figure 4: Change in Social Expenditure as a Proportion of GDP Box Plot 
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